What are the prerequisites for a euro-area fiscal capacity?  Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚14 | 2016 by Demertzis, Maria & Wolff, Guntram B.
Maria Demertzis (maria.
demertzis@bruegel.org) 
is a Research Fellow at 
Bruegel. Guntram B. 
Wolff (guntram.wolff@
bruegel.org) is the Director 
of Bruegel. 
This is the background paper 
for the presentation given 
at the informal ECOFIN in 
Bratislava on 9 September 
2016. A shortened version 
of this paper was circulated 
to the Ministers  and is also 
available for download on 
the Bruegel website.
Executive Summary
A monetary union without fiscal union is generally considered to be incomplete. We con-
sider three steps for increasing the centralisation of fiscal functions, and discuss the prerequi-
sites for moving forward at each one. Above all, fiscal integration is a matter of trust, which is 
currently at a low level.
The first step would be to complete banking union and establish a more credible no-bail-
out clause. The conditions for addressing the fiscal dimensions of banking union are a dena-
tionalisation of the banking policy framework – including as regards exposure to sovereign 
debt – addressing non-performing loans and legitimising the fiscal backstop. 
The second step would move on from the first by adding funds for public goods and in-
vestment in the EU. This step would create a re-insurance framework to help euro-area coun-
tries absorb large shocks. We consider a review of the EU budget and additional resources as 
conditions for this scenario. A system of check and balances is important. Last, we consider 
structural convergence to better deal with shocks as an essential prerequisite for mechanisms 
to cope with large shocks.
The last step constitutes our analytical benchmark as it would move substantial govern-
ment spending to the central level. This would allow euro-area fiscal stabilisation to be fully 
centralised. To enable this scenario, real economic differences between countries need to be 
lower, and a proper political union would need to be established, with legitimacy and a level 
of political integration very different from the situation today. 
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1. Introduction
The debate on what kind of fiscal union is needed for Europe’s monetary union dates back 
to before the start of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Eichengreen and von Hagen, 
1996) and re-emerged with the more recent crisis1. One view is that fiscal union for the euro 
area was rejected before monetary union started because it would have required political 
union, which member states did not want. But the view held by others, perhaps most notably 
former German chancellor Helmut Kohl, was that the euro would ultimately lead to irreversi-
ble European unification (Mody, 2014).
Historical-comparative research typically finds that monetary and fiscal unions go hand in 
hand. Functioning federations require at a minimum a credible no-bailout clause for sub-fed-
eral debt and a central budget that provides federation-wide public goods and services. The 
central budget is decided on by way of appropriate mechanisms that ensure political legiti-
macy. In established political unions, this central budget is typically large enough to provide 
fiscal stabilisation (Bordo et al, 2011). 
The United States of the founding fathers often serves a yardstick of comparison for the 
EU. But such comparisons have limitations2. The level of political integration that already 
existed in the US, the relatively small debt markets and the unsophisticated nature of the 
financial system at the time mean that such comparisons are not entirely relevant to the euro 
area. Furthermore, since US states had an overall small government sector, it was a compara-
tively small step to add the federal layer. But in the euro area, government spending is much 
larger, at between 40 percent and 58 percent of GDP. If fiscal union is to be understood as a 
centralisation of fiscal policy, one would have to discuss the shifting of significant spending 
from the national to the union-wide level. 
Discussing fiscal union is not easy in current circumstances. Trust in the European Union 
has fallen in recent years and remains at low levels (Figure 1). But some survey evidence sug-
gests that support for the EU has risen in a number of countries after the Brexit vote3. Never-
theless, the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU is often interpreted as a pushback against 
far-reaching integration steps4, though there is a counter view that the only way to salvage the 
monetary union project is to undertake further integration steps to improve its performance5. 
But there is substantial intellectual disagreement on what further integration steps would 
actually be helpful and necessary6.
In our assessment, the current euro-area institutional set-up has a number of key prob-
lems. The current fiscal rules are not implemented7, they lack credibility and do not achieve 
the optimal combination of fiscal sustainability and fiscal stabilisation. The EU’s fiscal 
framework has also been shown to suffer from significant measurement problems (Claeys 
and Darvas, 2015). A further problem is the absence of the definition of a fiscal policy stance 
for the euro area as a whole in a situation in which the effectiveness of monetary policy is con-
strained by the zero lower bound (Benassy-Quéré et al, 2016). Trust is missing that necessary 
fiscal buffers are available to enable national automatic stabilisers to play their role in case of 
a shock. Risk-sharing between countries to cater for large national shocks is limited. Never-
1  See for example Marzinotto, Sapir and Wolff (2011); PIsani-Ferry, Vihriälä and Wolff (2013); von Hagen (2014); Be-
nassy-Quéré, Ragot and Wolff (2016); Macron and Gabriel (2015); van Rompuy (2012); Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2016); 
Mody (2015).
2  Frieden (2016) and Henning and Kessler (2012) provide overviews.
3  According to surveys from YouGov, support for remaining in the EU increased relative to leave in Germany, Finland, France 
and Sweden, while it decreased in Denmark, between end-May and end-July 2016.
4  See Tusk (2016); Schäuble (2016).
5  See Gabriel and Schulz (2016); Verhofstadt (2016).
6  Baldwin and Giavazzi (2016) formulate an economists’ ‘consensus’ narrative. This however, is not uniformly shared, show-
ing the disagreement in academic circles. 
7  Darvas and Leandro (2015) show that implementation even lacks behind the implementation of recommendations by inter-
national institutions such as the OECD.
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theless, there is a perception that the no-bailout clause is not credible and financial assistance 
might even be given to countries with unsustainable debt. 
Figure 1: Trust in the EU
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Source: Bruegel based on Eurobarometer. Note: Trust is measured as net trust in euro-area countries. Net trust is computed as the differ-
ence between ‘tend to trust’ and ‘tend not to trust’.
It is against this background that we discuss three progressive steps for strengthening the 
fiscal framework at the euro-area level8. These lead to less interference in national fiscal pol-
icymaking thanks to a more credible no-bailout clause, increased risk sharing and different 
degrees of provision of euro-area-wide public goods and fiscal stabilisation9.
2. Strengthening the euro area’s fiscal 
framework in three steps
We consider increasing fiscal centralisation in three consecutive steps10. This first step can 
be seen as the minimum required to put the euro area onto a more stable footing, while the 
third can be seen as an analytical benchmark with a centralised fiscal budget and sufficient 
resources to fulfil a stabilisation role. The second step is an intermediate one that would help 
strengthen efficiency by centralising a small number of activities, establishing better provi-
sioning of European public goods and introducing elements of risk sharing for large idiosyn-
cratic shocks.
Responsibility for decision-making over fiscal policy has been and remains largely 
national, despite an elaborate EU framework of fiscal rules. An effective fiscal framework 
should assign responsibilities and legitimacy clearly between the European and the national 
levels. This means that in extreme situations, the no-bailout clause needs to have some credi-
bility. We define the no-bailout clause in line with Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
8  The three steps are comparable but not identical to those outlined in the Five Presidents’ Report: https://ec.europa.eu/priori-
ties/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf.
9  The table in the annex summarises our three steps and lists the conditions that are needed in each case.
10  This is one of the parallels with the proposals in the Five Presidents’ Report.
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of the EU: it allows the possibility of providing a loan on the condition that debt is sustainable, 
but it does not allow the assumption of unsustainable debt. We define credibility as the exist-
ence of a hard budget constraint, ie a financial assistance programme will only be approved 
if the country passes the debt sustainability analysis11. The no-bailout clause is more credible 
with greater financial stability. A fiscal backstop for the financial system and for essential 
government spending (for example through a European Stability Mechanism/Outright Mon-
etary Transactions (ESM/OMT) programme) can achieve greater stability. More specifically, 
to enhance financial stability, it is important to reduce the exposure of banks to sovereign 
decisions and sovereign debt12. 
The credibility of the no-bailout clause depends, somewhat paradoxically, on the level of 
fiscal and financial centralisation. When important government functions are centralised, 
it becomes easier to maintain stability in extreme situations, compared to unions in which 
the sub-central level carries out almost all functions of government. The degree of fiscal and 
financial centralisation and the enforcement of responsibilities at the national level are there-
fore linked. 
2.1 Step A: completing banking union
Our step A would complete first and foremost the banking union. This still requires a 
European Deposit Insurance System, an appropriate fiscal backstop and a further denational-
isation of banking policies, including less exposure to sovereign debt and changed bank own-
ership structures. Banking union is indispensable in a monetary union that wishes to ensure 
stability, even in the face of possible sovereign debt crises. Financial stability crucially hinges 
on the stability of banks. Finally, and with all of the above achieved, we would subsequently 
envisage a gradual reduction in the intrusiveness of European fiscal rules and a reform of the 
EU’s fiscal rules. 
It is important that the ESM and OMT programme continue to exist in order to ensure that 
sovereign debt is not subject to self-fulfilling liquidity crises. Sovereign debt would remain 
a national responsibility and a safe asset comparable to sovereign debt outside of monetary 
unions. Only, in extreme cases, if the Eurogroup/ESM decides that debt is not sustainable, 
would its nature change.
This scenario would not address the problem of the macroeconomic management of the 
euro area as a whole. In particular, when interest rates are at the zero lower bound, the Euro-
pean Central Bank becomes less effective in achieving its inflation target. In such situations, it 
would be up to fiscal and economic authorities to support macroeconomic management with 
appropriate fiscal and structural policies. But in this first step, there would be no central tool 
other than monetary policy to ensure price stability. Loose fiscal policy coordination should 
play a role but is unlikely to be fully up to the task. 
A second problem would be that for countries that mismanage their public finances and 
lose market access, there would be limited fiscal instruments other than the ESM to prevent 
large, pro-cyclical fiscal tightening.
A third unaddressed problem is the absence of any financing mechanisms to provide for 
commonly shared public goods, such as climate policies or security and defence measures. 
2.2 Step B: Providing European public goods, financing investments and 
insuring against large idiosyncratic risks
In our second step, we envisage adding a small fiscal capacity, which would fund 
some European public goods, such as external and internal security, climate policies and 
migration policies, beyond what is currently funded by the EU budget. The fiscal capacity 
11  This condition is central to the European Stability Mechanism treaty. In practice, it is well known that debt sustainability 
analysis is not clear-cut. Ultimately, markets will judge the credibility of the no-bail-out clause by not instigating a credit event. 
12  Pisani-Ferry (2016). It is an open question whether the euro area needs a formal debt restructuring mechanism, with plausi-
ble arguments for and against. 
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would also provide resources for pan-European investment. This part of fiscal union need 
not be restricted to the euro area, but can involve the EU as a whole, because the public 
goods are not just for the euro area. Moreover, an insurance system (for example European              
unemployment reinsurance) would be established to help euro-area countries that are hit by 
large shocks.
The important value added of this second step is that it would provide common solutions 
to problems shared by European citizens – so truly European public goods. In addition, 
depending on the way these goods are funded, the fiscal capacity could contribute to cyclical 
stabilisation of the euro area as a whole. The more cyclical the revenue sources, the greater 
their stabilisation properties could be. Such fiscal capacity could create a social mechanism 
to mitigate the impact of major recessions on those most affected. The implied risk shar-
ing would also somewhat help with national fiscal stabilisation policies, should national                           
borrowing become constrained13. 
But overall it is clear that this scenario does not create a fiscal capacity at the euro-area 
level to manage fiscal stabilisation policies. Maintaining sound national fiscal policies would 
remain crucial to allow the necessary fiscal space so that automatic stabilisers can play their 
roles in full.
2.3 Step C: A true fiscal federation with spending and taxing powers at the 
federal level
Our last step C, which we consider an analytical benchmark, would shift significant 
spending items to the federal level in order to centralise or federalise important functions of 
fiscal and public policy. This would be a much more ambitious plan that aims to apply Euro-
pean solutions in areas such as defence and social policy. The federal level would take care 
of significant parts of stabilisation policy, for example through centralised unemployment 
insurance, health insurance and pension system amounting to perhaps 20 percent of total 
government spending. It would make the euro area’s fiscal union more comparable to the 
United States, where about 65 percent of total government spending is at the federal level. The 
ability to raise federal taxes and to issue federal debt would be part of this scenario. Reaching 
this last step would essentially mean the end for national fiscal policy coordination. There 
would be a euro-area fiscal capacity of sufficient size to deal with all aspects of the euro area’s 
fiscal affairs, ie allocative, redistributive and for stabilisation purposes. National fiscal policy 
would correspondingly lose importance. In this scenario, the no-bailout clause for national-
ly-issued debt would be as credible as it can get through design, and would remain central.
3 Prerequisites for each step
Achieving different levels of fiscal integration in a currency union is above all a political 
question. It involves complex questions of political trust, shifting legitimacy and accounta-
bility from the national to the supra-national level, and also dealing with different citizens’ 
preferences. In general terms, the provision of European public goods could be done more 
effectively at the European level because it could take into account the cross-border external-
ities. However, a more centralised provision of public goods may not be appropriate if citizens 
have very different preferences.
The achievement of a fiscal union as described in step A boils down to managing impor-
tant transition questions but also major political questions in relation to banking policies. The 
full fiscal union of the last step (C) on the other hand involves a level of political integration 
13  Claeys et al (2014) computed how a European unemployment insurance scheme with a borrowing capacity could have 
helped countries such as Spain during the crisis in orders of magnitude of several percentage points of GDP.
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that is very different from today. The second step involves difficulties that are between those 
of the other two. The time horizon for the different scenarios is different. A time horizon of 2-5 
years might be adequate to complete step A, while step C would serve as an analytical bench-
mark beyond the time horizon of policymakers. 
3.1 Prerequisites for moving forward with step A
Step A aims to achieve less-intrusive fiscal governance on narrow budgetary matters while 
Europeanising financial and in particular banking policy. Managing the transition from a 
predominantly national-based banking system to a European banking policy system remains 
the central question. This is an ongoing policy debate since the decision of heads of states and 
government in July 2012 to “break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”.
Prerequisite 1: Address the fiscal dimension of a banking union
After the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mech-
anism, the debate has now shifted to the third pillar of banking union, the European Deposit 
Insurance System (EDIS). The policy debates on EDIS and on the backstop to the resolution 
fund are necessary but controversial because they concern the fiscal dimension of banking 
union (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2012). The primary role of deposit insurance is to create and 
maintain trust in the financial system. Depositors’ confidence in the safety of their deposits 
in banks is fundamental to financial stability and banking stability in a monetary system 
based on fiat money. There are three basic arguments that call for the creation of a pooled 
European insurance system (Wolff, 2016). The first is about size: insurance works better, the 
greater number of banks that it covers. If insurance in a small country only covers a few banks, 
a claim could increase the costs of subsequent insurance permanently, thereby imposing a 
burden on the country’s banking system. Second, centralised supervision while deposit insur-
ance is decentralised is inconsistent. In extremis, national deposit insurance and national tax-
payers would have to stand ready to address problems that have arisen because of potentially 
inadequate European supervision. Third, decoupling banks from sovereigns, the very aim of 
banking union, requires European deposit insurance as otherwise confidence will depend 
on the creditworthiness of the sovereign. European deposit insurance will therefore increase 
financial stability and improve crisis management.
Prerequisite 2: Ensure that banking policy is denationalised
But EDIS and a fiscal backstop alone would not completely denationalise banking pol-
icies. Most importantly, bank exposures to sovereign debt must be reduced. Beyond that, 
the debate also needs to include other policies that materially influence the health of banks, 
issues such as insolvency legislation and the influence of governments over the ownership             
of banks.
How can banks’ exposure to domestic sovereign debt be reduced? Reducing banks’ expo-
sure to sovereign debt is one condition for creating EDIS, as otherwise the insurance would 
potentially have to cover sovereign problems. But introducing a simple exposure rule or 
sovereign risk weights can create substantial problems at the point of introduction. The main 
risk is that holders of weak debt would sell it, thereby triggering a sovereign debt crisis. One 
option to deal with this transition problem would be to create a transitional buyer. Creation of 
a joint-and-several stability fund to manage this problem has been suggested by some, but it 
has been noted by others that the ECB currently is a large buyer of sovereign debt and the risk 
of introducing exposure rules for banks is therefore muted14. Depending on the way banks’ 
debt holdings are reduced, there might be a need to either introduce preferential treatment 
14  Corsetti et al (2016); Mogadham (2016). Andritzky et al (2016) propose the introduction of automatic debt restructuring 
clauses as debt is rolled over. They argue that this would allow for a smooth process. However, in our view, it is unclear wheth-
er it would be possible to actually roll over legacy debt when the new debt comes with clear restructuring clauses. Moreover, 
automatic debt restructuring clauses can create significant financial stability problems.
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of baskets of debt or to introduce safe European debt, possibly in the form of synthetic ESBies 
(Brunnermaier et al, 2011). 
Prerequisite 3: Address non-performing loans in the banking system
The ability of banks to withstand transition problems as banking union advances depends 
on the overall state of their balance sheets. Currently, the acute problem of NPLs in a number 
of countries implies that the financial system is still vulnerable to unforeseen shocks and to 
new architectural demands. Certainly in transition, addressing the issue of unproductive debt 
in a timely and effective way is a significant prerequisite for the completion of banking union.
Prerequisite 4: Ensure the legitimacy and accountability of the fiscal backstop
Creating such a complete banking union framework also raises issues of political account-
ability. Is the Eurogroup the right political counterpart to Europe’s single supervisor? Does 
the definition of a proper European fiscal backstop not also require the creation of a political 
head in charge of that backstop? Who would have the legal and political authority to authorise 
funds? A possible step could be the creation of a permanent Eurogroup president, who would 
be appointed by the Eurogroup and the European Parliament in euro-area composition. But 
as long as the resources primarily come from national tax authorities, there will be signifi-
cant constitutional and political problems. To fully move the framework to a truly centralised 
authority, a legal base would need to be established. 
Prerequisite 5: Reduce interference from the centre in national fiscal policies
Finally, Europe’s current fiscal framework could also be reformed during this step. As 
the prerequisites we have mentioned are put in place, the no-bailout clause would become 
more credible, reducing the need for intrusive fiscal monitoring in normal times. We would 
envisage a reform that pushes the responsibility for achieving sound and stable public 
finances largely to the national level. Suitable rules could be defined at European level 
but implemented through national institutions15. Overall, this would allow national fiscal 
policies to play their fiscal stabilisation role in full, depending only on the available fiscal 
space and not on political constraints arising out of the application of Stability and Growth                 
Pact recommendations.
3.2 Prerequisites for moving forward with step B
Building on what would have been achieved in step A, step B would allocate some fiscal 
resources to the centre to provide for common public goods, to increase and finance Euro-
pean investment and to insure against large, country-specific shocks. By allocating funds to 
the centre, this scenario would be a clear departure from the current system and therefore 
would require new agreements between members. We would envisage that these resources 
would be used for managing border protection, perhaps even defence, investment and Euro-
pean unemployment re-insurance in the event of major shocks. The key issues for discussion 
are financing and governance.  
Prerequisite 1: Finance public goods that are truly European in nature
Providing European public goods is, above all, a question of political will. In current 
circumstances, there is an emphasis on demonstrating to citizens that EU policies provide 
concrete value added. The sources of financing are important. Most of these public goods are 
not specific to the euro area. Some are directly related to the Schengen area while others are 
related to the EU. The EU budget could be the main vehicle for such public goods. Arguably, 
part of the funding could come from a spending review of the current EU budget. The ques-
tion is then where the additional fiscal resources should come from. In principle, they could 
15  An example of a new rules framework would be along the lines of Claeys, Darvas and Leandro (2016) with emphasis on 
government expenditure, debt and a special golden rule to allow for investment expenditure.
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either be a contribution from national budgets or a new tax resource at the central level. These 
options would have very different implications in terms of governance, legal base and also 
their economic stabilisation properties.
Prerequisite 2: Establish a system of checks and balances
How can political checks and balances, accountability and good governance be ensured? 
The more functions are centrally provided in the EU, the more this question is central. For 
example, external border control is a topic of great importance to citizens. While it can be 
provided through a technical authority like Frontex, there needs to be a political mandate and 
clear rules of political accountability for such authority’s actions. Equally important is exe-
cution, effectiveness, decision processes and involvement of national authorities. The more 
centralised the execution of tasks becomes, the more the legitimacy and checks and balances 
need to come from centralised bodies. Political legitimacy cannot come only from intergov-
ernmental mechanisms but would need to also involve community sources.
 Prerequisite 3: Improve resilience to shocks 
Improving structures that increase resilience to shocks is indispensable for sharing risks 
coming from large shocks1616. Monetary union lacks the exchange rate as an adjustment chan-
nel. Therefore, other adjustment mechanisms, such as flexible labour markets, are needed 
to cater for shocks1717. However, adjustment mechanisms in the form of more flexible labour 
markets can also interfere with Europe’s social model.
Additional fiscal risk-sharing will require institutional convergence so that country policy 
responses to similar shocks are not free-riding on insurance. For example, creating a system 
that can re-insure national unemployment insurance would require some minimal con-
vergence on labour market institutions. But full European unemployment insurance would 
require fairly converged or even a single set of labour market institutions. 
The more one wanted to increase fiscal risk sharing, the more important it would be to 
reduce real economic dispersion and enhance political legitimacy.
3.3 Prerequisites for moving forward with step C
Step C requires that all the prerequisites for A and B are in place. This implies that the 
establishment of European banking union with common supervision and backed by a 
European deposit guarantee system and a fiscal backstop. Also, domestic banking sectors will 
have a looser relationship to the sovereign than currently, reducing their mutual dependence. 
There will be clear identification of what constitutes a European public good and a centralised 
budget that will provide for it. Clear rules on how responsibilities are divided and accounta-
bility is sought will have been established. Sufficient structural convergence will have been 
achieved to increase resilience to country-specific shocks.
Although short of a full fiscal union, such starting conditions will mean that some fiscal 
resources have already been pooled. The countries themselves, however, remain in charge of 
fiscal budgets and are thus responsible for contributing to their own macroeconomic stabili-
sation. We identify two prerequisites to move forward.
Prerequisite 1: Reduce real economic dispersion
Experience shows that structural differences can be persistent. And while there has been 
some convergence in the euro area, the differences in income levels are still larger than in the 
US (Table 1). Direct fiscal transfers from relatively rich to relatively poor regions exist in full 
federations to help sustain their cohesiveness. But if differences are too large, they may not be 
sustainable politically. However, differences in euro-area employment rates are comparable 
16 Bayoumi, T. and B. Eichengreen (1994), Frankel, J. and A. Rose (1998). 
17 Demertzis, M. and A. Hughes Hallett (1998), Demertzis, M., A. Hughes Hallett and O. Rummel (2000a), Demertzis, 
M., A. Hughes Hallett and Y. Ma (2000b), Pissarides, C. (1997).
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to those in the US, potentially allowing for a form of partial unemployment insurance. 
Table 1: Real economic dispersion across the euro-area countries by comparison 
to US states: GDP per capita and employment rate
Coeff. of variation Euro area (w/o Lux) 
1999
Euro area (w/o Lux) 
2015
United States (w/o 
DC) 2015
GDP per cap. 0.54 0.41 0.18
Employment rate 0.07 0.06 0.07
Source: Bruegel based on AMECO (ECFIN) and Bureau of Economic Analysis. Note: GDP per capita and employment rate in percent of the 
working age population. The coefficient of variation is a normalised measure of dispersion that allows comparisons. Higher values indicate 
more significant differences across states. Numbers based on 18-member euro area. For employment rates we have also considered the 
original 11-euro area members (without Luxembourg) instead: 0.059 and 0.052 for 1999 and 2015 respectively.
Reducing real economic differences could help increase the appetite for risk sharing. 
Structural reforms that, for example, improve the effectiveness of the justice system and the 
government sector more broadly, improve educational outcomes, enable better management 
of the debt overhang and insolvencies, or improve the resilience of the financial system, 
are important for the growth performance of our economies and for their resilience against 
global shocks. We consider progress in these areas an important political condition for more 
far-reaching fiscal risk-sharing but we note that fiscal transfers aim at increasing cohesiveness 
of unions with different living standards. 
Prerequisite 2: Taxation and representation
Shifting macroeconomic stabilisation from the national level to the European centre 
requires a major shift in sovereignty, spending and taxation to the European level. It would 
require the political will to grant direct authority to raise taxes and political authority to form 
a proper euro-area government in charge of the policy areas that are centralised. For this to 
happen, it would be fundamental to move to a different level of democratic accountability 
and institutions. The outcome would be essentially a political union with democratic deci-
sion-making at the federal level and executive authority at that level. Achieving such a vision 
is, to our mind, far away. Perhaps the most important prerequisite would be a clear sense of 
European identity among citizens.
4. Conclusions
Increasing fiscal capacity is desirable for the economic stability of the euro area and would 
improve economic performance. But advancing this agenda is difficult politically and raises 
serious questions about cohesiveness and how much economic convergence is needed. We 
have discussed possible conditions that in our view would make progress easier. The ques-
tion then is what types of policies are available to policymakers and what European-level 
involvement is desirable. Instruments such as the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure have 
proven rather ineffective. Ultimately, it is up to national policymakers to act and to European 
partners to coordinate their actions to make progress and create institutions that allow for 
legitimate and efficient risk sharing and better management of the euro area’s fiscal stance. It 
is also about generating trust by implementing decisions and delivering results that are visible 
to all.
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Annex
Table: Summary of conditions necessary to achieve greater fiscal centralisation
Fiscal centralisation element Conditions
Scenario A
• Deposit insurance & fiscal 
backstop
• Less intrusive intervention on 
national fiscal policies from 
centre
• Greater credibility of no-bailout 
clause
• Address fiscal dimension of bank-
ing union
• Denationalise banking policy 
framework
• Address non-performing loan 
problems
• Address the issue of legitimacy 
and accountability of the fiscal 
backstop
• Reduce interference in national 
fiscal policies from the centre
Scenario B
• Provision of European public 
goods
• Resources for investment 
spending
• Re-insurance system to 
address large country-specific 
shocks
• Finance public goods that are of 
true European nature
• Establish a system of checks and 
balances
• Structural convergence for in-
creased ability to react to shocks
